human capital is therefore, for Kierkegaard, an ontological error, and not merely matter of choosing between authenticity and inauthenticity, for it reverses the relation between these terms, and confuses the condition with the conditioned. Before we get to the diagnosis of this error, whose detail will have to wait to the end of this paper, we want to explain why we agree with Tronti that in the current crisis it would be worth our while to read Kierkegaard again.
The Tragedy of Politics
In 1966, Mario Tronti, published the classic book of the Operismo movement in Italy, Operai e capitale [Workers and Capital] , which runs like a hidden source throughout the writings of Italian political thinkers. 3 His thesis is that the struggle at the heart of capitalism lies between the worker and capital. To enter the labour market, so classical economic theory tells us, the individual worker has to sell their expertise, skill and ability to an individual capitalist. The relation between work and capital is presented as though it were supposedly the relation between free individuals buying and selling objectified labour as salaried labour. For Tronti, however, such a model of the labour market is an idealisation. The individuality upon which the model depends is actually produced by that model. The worker already understands themselves as human capital as an investment for future earnings. I relate to myself as a commodity that has a certain value summed up by the level of a salary I might earn. The model does not take up what it already given. It has to produce a society where people already view themselves in this way. In this way, it is only capital that is truly free. The free individual is dependent on capital for his or her existence. This process of individualisation is the objectification of the subject. In place of the living human subject, part of a larger societal whole, capital produces a generalised subjectivity.
During the revolts of the '60s and '70s, Tronti hoped that the self-organisation of those workers, who knew their lives were mutilated by the monopoly of capital, could resist this objectification, thereby changing the nature of capitalism itself. Yet even in Operai e capitale, there is already the presentiment that such a political struggle is coming to an end.
Rather than announcing a new age of politics, Tronti already pronounces its eulogy. The politics of revolution would be replaced by the politics of reflection, which is nothing but the management of capital.
Does this mean that resistance is futile? We have to create new collectivities that have never been imagined, but to do so means we first of all have to win back our own subjectivity from the generalised subjectivity of human capital. If human capital is the objectification of subjectivity through salaried labour, then the passionate revolutionary act in the present age is to recover the self that continually escapes this process. Yet how can the self resist its own objectification, when it only recognises itself in this form? The objectification of the worker in human capital might be an ontic fact, but as the only possibility of existence it is always an ontological mistake. The point here is not say what the future is, for this would be always to define it in terms of a present actuality, but to demonstrate that the future is always open and only appears impossible from the viewpoint of the present. What is beneath the objectified self, is not an authentic individual defined in advance, but the power of the possible over the actual, which means that the actual is always a reduction of the possible, and the possible always greater than the actual.
There is one reader who would profoundly disagree with our thesis that Kierkegaard's work is a weapon against capital. Indeed, he would argue that his work is a symptom of the disease rather than its cure. So we must next answer to his doubts and scepticism about our whole endeavour.
The Philosopher of the Interior
Of all the philosophers to take Kierkegaard seriously as a political thinker, Adorno was the quickest to condemn him as a philosopher, quite literally, of interiors. His shelter from history and the objective forces that seek to destroy him 'is the bourgeois intérieur of the nineteenth century, before which all talk of subject, object, indifferentiation, and situation pales to an abstract metaphor'. The table is no longer a table, but a symbol, the chair is no longer a chair, and so on, as though the interior itself, created against the disappearance of the world, were to become the sign of an unchanging and eternal nature. Yet the world supposedly saved is just one more step in its ever increasing fading and decline, reduced to the distorted and misshapen view from my apartment peephole.
For Adorno, the real origin of the internal is the external, the inward, the historical, and the economic, the individual. The isolated individual is the result of social forces that isolate individuals and thus in no way can be a critical response to them. It is not the cure, but the consequence of the very disease it has discovered. The response to the alienation of the individual in modern society is not to retreat into inwardness but to rediscover the relation between the self and others that sustains even that society that disdains them. Yet there might be an objective reason why we might hesitate before Adorno's critique because the very inwardness of the self has become the objectivity of the world, not for the reason he explains, that both the object and the subject have become objectless, but the world has become too 'subjectful'. The furniture in Kierkegaard's apartment, Adorno tells us, have become divorced and separated from the use-value of objects stripped from them by the 'economic process'. Yet is it the authenticity of the object we should first of all concern us? For the 'economic process' that led to their spectral presence lies not in the opposition of the internal and the external, but the internalisation of the external, the becoming subjective of capital.
You might respond that this does not at all invalidate Adorno's criticism, but simply situates the problem at another level. The inwardness of the self is just a pale reflection of this subjectification, an answer confusing itself with the question, so it makes no difference whether we situate this alienation of the side of the self or the object. Our reply would be that the movement of inwardness, precisely because it is a relation to the outside, is a resistance to this subjectification and not merely its confirmation. The critic says inwardness is a mirror held up to reality of which it is merely a product but from which it mistakenly imagines that it has freed itself, like the suicide victim who thinks they have escaped the pain of existence but thereby have merely confirmed it once more and perhaps to the highest degree by their act.
We say inwardness operates as a counter movement to subjectification at the same level of It is not a matter here, in response to what appears the remorseless victory of human capital, to appeal to an authentic individual who would be exterior to the flows of capital and labour, because it is precisely this authentic individual that is produced in the flows. Capital and subjectivity are synonymous in human capital, so any appeal to a self would be immediately interiorised. It is not as though in the contemporary age anyone thinks that we should be less authentic, objectified and alienated in work; rather work should be an expression of our creative freedom. It is this 'creative freedom' that is our alienation. It is not authentic individuality that is at stake here but what is more profound than any objectified subject, which is the possible. This is why Kierkegaard never tells us objectively what it means to be subjective (as though you might define this in advance). We must make the distinction between what the self is, its role and identity within society and how the self is. In the first case, the self is an actual self. It is the self arrived at the end of a process. It is the self I have invested in through my education, training and health. But the self as a 'how' is not a self in this sense at all; it is the self of the possible over and above the actual, rather than subordinate to it. The first self is ontic; the second ontological. Human capital never goes to the limit of the objectified interiority of the self, even though it is utterly parasitical on its abilities and capacities that exceed it. What matters in the rationally governed society of human capital is the partial actualisation of possibilities and never the pure possibilities of life that precede any actualisation. This explains its fatalism and despair.
The paradox of writing about Kierkegaard is in speaking about the passionate self you immediately change it into the actual self. This is the danger of examples. There is one way to avoid this danger. Rather than describing what he writes describe how he writes.
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writing is the very practice of being a passionate self and it is to this we shall now turn. The form of his work is not merely an aesthetic contingency, but expresses the very difference between the actual and the possible self. 
The Passion of Thinking
The content of Kierkegaard's thought cannot be separated from its form. You cannot ignore how he writes as though you could get straight to his thought and disregard its style.
Philosophy imagines thought could be communicated without the necessity of words. Of course it knows this is an impossible dream, but at best it suffers words as a means of communication rather than the real expression of thought. Words are merely the vehicle, whereas thought are what animate words from within. In this way, we can distinguish between thoughtless and thoughtful words. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writing is not a mere addition, a trick meant to deceive the readers, whose exhausted response might be to 9 Of course this is not the only performance in Kierkegaard work but it is the drama that produces it. Indeed you could argue that it is littered with such performances. The image we have in mind here is his famous analogy of the swimmer. 'In learning to go through the motions of swimming, one can be suspended from the ceiling in a harness and then presumably describe the movements, but one is not swimming.' Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling Repetition, trans. 10 If it were not so, then it would be no problem to speak of him in the same way we speak of other philosophers and thereby insert thought easily within our historical canon. That he wrote under other names than his own was not because he wished to hide himself from some exterior reason, so for example to remain unknown to others, but an interior relation to his thought itself. 11 By 'interior', we do not mean the interior of Kierkegaard, of which we know nothing, as he himself does not, but the relation of thought to its own production. In other words, that thought itself, in relation to itself, is essentially anonymous, despite the intention of the author who writes the words. I think more than I am capable of thinking. It is this 'more' that is the basis of Kierkegaard's pseudonymity, and not some hidden desire to conceal an actual self. Facing this 'more', Kierkegaard is on the side of the reader rather than himself, and can claim no more authority 'to know' than they.
Indirect communication, therefore, is not something that befalls his thought from without, whether from psychological, social or historical reasons (because, for example, he wanted to write without public censure), but because it is intrinsic to the nature of this thought, or any thought, where the object and activity of thought are split, and thinking places itself in this split as its very possibility. It is this separation that is the true meaning of subjective as opposed to objective thought. It is not that he is proposing a different thought from Hegel (even if we think that he thought is the thought that all thought is subjective), but this thinking cannot be expressed in a thought, not even this one, because of the separation between thinking and thought itself. This separation is made possible only in the essential basis of its own production that destroys the individual who writes. This is why the issue is not whether you should use the name 'Kierkegaard', when you refer to his pseudonymous writings, but that you know what this name means. It is the author who suffers his work as that which is furthest from himself as something known and actual and who communicates this lack of knowledge to the reader as the very movement of thought itself indirectly through writing. Writing is not something that thought suffers as an unnecessary burden, but the very suffering of thought not to be able to express itself as its own truth.
The difference between thinking and what is thought is the passion of thinking. The passion of thinking can only be communicated indirectly through the words themselves and not the ideas they are meant to contain, because I have no privilege access to them beyond the words that I write. The passion of thinking is only present when I am not present to myself, when my thought is more than I am capable of thinking. As readers of Kierkegaard, we have to guard ourselves against the temptation of reading him in the opposite way he wishes us to do so, and how he reads himself. We translate everything he has written into objective thought, into an actuality, into a product we might own and possess as an investment. In so doing, we would miss the passion of thinking, the movement of thought, which each one of us is meant to enact for ourselves. It is too hasty to call this passion subjective, as opposed to objective thought, because it is this separation between thinking and thought that makes the passion of thinking possible.
Without the separation of thought, without its distance from me, there would be no passion.
We need to distinguish, therefore, between the self that owns and possesses its thought and the self that is disowned and dispossessed by its thought. One relates to thought as actuality and the other as possibility. This distinction between the actual and the possible is more fundamental than the difference between subjective and objective thought, if you think of the one as inward, and the other as external. For thinking to be passionate it is not enough that it is merely interior, it has to be divided against itself, thinking that thinks a thought that is not itself.
The passion of thinking is the difference between the activity of thought and what is thought in this activity. Thinking itself cannot be an object of thought. This is the mistake that reflection makes when it believes it can get behind itself and capture the origin of thinking, like a snake biting its own tail. As soon as I make thinking an object of thought then it is no longer thinking but thought. The difference between thinking and thought can be experienced either negatively or positively. Negatively it is the ossification of thinking, its paralysis and stupefaction in actuality, as though thought where the end of thinking rather than its beginning, a blockage or impediment. It would be the melancholy we experience when we feel that nothing we write or say really expresses what we thought. 'positive third' is God, but we should not confuse this with an objective reality proved by thought. The self relates to God not as an actuality, as though it were merely one more item to be added onto the world, but as a possibility reached only when it has come to the end of every possibility. It is a possibility experienced, then paradoxically, through the impossibility of every possibility, an infinite as opposed to finite possibility:
When someone faints, we call for water, eau de Cologne, smelling salts, but when someone wants to despair, then the word is: Get possibility, get possibility, possibility is the only salvation. A possibility -then the person is despairs breaths again, he revives again, for without possibility a person seems unable to breath. At times the ingeniousness of the human imagination can extend to the point of creating possibility, but at last -that is, when it depends upon faith -then only this helps, that for God everything is possible.
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The difference between the possible and the actual is an ontological one and it at the heart of understanding the passionate self.
Infinite Freedom
Heidegger was wrong to say that Kierkegaard had no ontology. 17 The opposite is the case. commentary change is ultimately explained theologically. 20 Change is described through the difference between potentiality and actuality, and priority is given to actuality, since nothing potential could exist without a prior actuality, and without a pure actuality we would have an infinite regress.
Can change be interpreted ontologically rather than theologically? This is Aubenque's gambit. To explain change ontologically would mean reversing the relation between potentiality and actuality, on the one hand, and change, on the other. It is not the difference between potentiality and actuality that explains change, but the meaning of change, which is a specific interpretation of being, that explains the difference between potentiality and actuality. The problem of change is how the unity of something can be maintained over multiple determinations. How can Socrates both be young and old, pale and tanned, and still be the same Socrates? The answer to this question cannot just be that Socrates has the potential to be young, old, pale and tanned, because then we are just going around in circles.
The answer is in the meaning of being as such, and that being has two meanings for Aristotle, essential and accidental. There is no contradiction between the one and the multiple because
Socrates is not one and multiple in the same sense. He is essentially one and accidentally multiple. It is the difference between these two meanings of being that explains the difference between potentiality and actuality. If there were only one meaning of being, essential, then there would be only actuality and no potentiality. Likewise, if being were only accidental, then there would be only potentials and no actualities.
Being is nothing but what we say about being. It only has a referential meaning.
Being has a meaning because we speak about being. This is why being is not a genus for
Aristotle. When we speak about being we are not speaking about this or that thing, rather the meaning of being is the way we speak about things, how we refer to them. The being we are speaking of is the being of the sublunary world. 21 The being of the world is the being of movement. This being is incomplete in two ways: it is fragmented in time and is always changing (becoming other to itself, to use Aristotle's expression). What is important to stress here is the being we speak of is incomplete. In this sense, the being of movement relates to
Aristotle's definition of the infinite.
It can come as a surprise to many that Aristotle is a philosopher of the infinite, for they associate him with the finite. 22 Is not the universe itself finite for Aristotle, and does he not speak of the infinite as irrational? But in both cases Aristotle is speaking of an infinite thing, either an infinite universe or an infinite bound series, but not an infinite process. An infinite process is not irrational because it does not imply a bounded totality that would be infinite; in other words, an actual infinite magnitude. If infinity is to have a meaning, then it can only be as a potentiality, but we have to careful by what we mean by 'potential' here. The possibility of confusion lies in the fact that Aristotle does describe infinity as an actuality, but it is like the actuality of a day or a contest rather than an infinite magnitude (Phys. 206 a 21-5). 23 The infinite is like a day or contest in that it is not all there at once. When we say the day or contest is happening, we do not mean all the instants of the day are happening. The difference, however, between the infinite, and the day or contest, is that the latter are finite wholes. The day and the contest come to an end, whereas the infinite does not. The infinite is an imperfect or incomplete actuality. It remains permanently unfulfilled. Because the infinite is not a whole, it is not a 'this'. It is not a thing or substance. It is not the coming to be of something, but 'coming to be' as such that never comes to an end.
The being of motion is infinite in this sense. It is an imperfect or incomplete actuality.
Aristotle says as much in the Greek: ἠ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐvτελέχια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον κίνησίς ἐστιν (change is the actuality of that which is potential as such) (Phys. 201 a 10). 24 It is because being is incomplete, always coming to be, that there is a difference between potentiality and actuality. If being were complete, then nothing would come into existence (or go out of existence), for everything would be what it is necessarily. There would be, then, no motion.
Another way of understanding the incompleteness of being, at least at the level of the mundane world, is that nothing is what it is. Socrates is never perfectly Socrates; the apple tree is never perfectly the apple tree, and so on. It is because everything is never what it is that everything is fragmented in time, and always becoming other to itself. This explains also why being is said in to ways, essentially and accidentally. If everything is essentially what it is, then there would be no accidental properties. On the contrary, in this world, we see everything is on the way to being itself but never wholly becomes itself. Simply by happening the past shows that it is not necessary, for if it had not occurred then the necessary attributes would not be true (Socrates did not exist, he was not wise, and there was no Athens). We try to obscure the contingency of being by transforming the happening of what happens to something that has happened, but this is an ontological error for Kierkegaard. It is to confuse being with a being, existence with an essence (as though existence itself had an essence). What exists (essence) is not the same as 'coming into
existence' of what exists (existence). I might marvel at the star in the sky, Kierkegaard remarks, and everything that it is, but one can also be astonished that it exists at all. 'believes what it does not see; it does not believe that the star exists, for that it sees, but it believes that it has come into existence.' 30 To doubt something is not the same as not to believe in the happening of something. The former is a modest doubt. I might doubt whether the star really is as I see it, but this is nothing as to refuse to believe the star had ever come into existence. This, Kierkegaard argues, is an act of will. It is to see everything in a different light. It would be to see one's seeing another way. Yet one could not appeal to the facts to explain this change, for it is precisely these facts one now views otherwise. Towards the actual one has knowledge; towards the possible, the happening of the actual, one can only have faith, but faith you must have.
With this difficult and arcane discussion of Kierkegaard's ontology via Aristotle, we might feel we have wandered far away from our original question as to whether he is still relevant to our age. This is not a matter of whether professional philosophers are still and will be reading him (something no doubt that would make him shudder), but whether he still speaks to us politically and why Tronti would have suggested now is the time to read him again. Capitalism is increasingly a problem of subjectivity. Human capital has now become the definition of capital as a whole, and Foucault is right to describe this as a singular event in history, whose consequences we are only beginning to understand. We need to think this event ontologically. This requires, first of all, we understand it in the proper way. This means, above all, we understand it historically, because this is precisely how capitalism obscures its own 'coming into existence', and that the only relation to the happening of capitalism as an event can be a matter of belief. It exists because we have faith in it. The worst way to read Kierkegaard is to think it is a matter of discovering an authentic subjectivity, for it is this authenticity that has been appropriated by capital. What is it that Kierkegaard teaches us? The possible always precedes and is greater than the actual. There is always an alternative, for what is comes into existence and passes out of existence. Being is incomplete and imperfect and there is no necessity in this world. It is up to us, whoever 'we' are, to look for those possibilities that have always accompanied the past, but we will only do so by looking towards the future out of this infernal frozen present in which all possibilities appear to have been annihilated and whose slogan is 'there is no alternative'. On the contrary, Kierkegaard tells us, 'in existence the watchword is always "forward".' 31
